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STATE OF UTAH 









BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a denial of appellant's 
motion to vacate a guilty plea, said motion based upon the 
breach of a plea bargaining agreement, 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court denied appellant's motion to 
vacate his guilty plea to a third degree felony. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the denial of appellant's 
motion to vacate affirmed. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts appellant's Statement of 
Facts but wishes to add that the Memorandum Decision 
(R-57) of the trial court judge issued after the full 
hearing on the Motion to Vacate (T-l) states that the 
court was not made aware of the breached plea bargaining 
agreement until December 5, 1975, when the Motion to 
Vacate the plea was officially brought before the 
court. Further, the Motion to Vacate was denied for 
the reason that appellant had waited eight months to 
complain of the breached agreement, letting the sentencing 
and numerous other opportunities pass before bringing 
to the court's attention the unkept agreement (R-57). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHERE APPELLANT WAITED EIGHT MONTHS TO COMPLAIN 
ABOUT THE BREACH OF A PLEA BARGAINING AGREEMENT, APPEARING 
BEFORE THE COURT ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS WITHOUT BRINGING 
TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURT THE BREACH OF THE AGREE-
MENT, HE HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO HAVE THE GUILTY PLEA 
VACATED. 
It is within the discretion of the trial court 
to determine whether a guilty plea may be withdrawn. 
This rule of law in Utah is set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 77-24-3 (1953), as amended, which provides in part that: 
V ". . . the court may at any 
time before judgment, upon 
a plea of guilty, permit it to 
be withdrawn and a plea of not 
guilty substituted," 
The Utah Legislature has thus codified the 
sound public policy of prohibiting the withdrawal of 
a guilty plea after the imposition of sentence, and 
has authorized the trial court to examine each re-
quest to withdraw a guilty plea according to the unique 
circumstances of each case. 
The instant case concededly involves the 
breach of a plea bargaining agreement on the part of 
the state. Nevertheless, respondent submits that Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-24-3 (1953), as amended, still operates 
to place discretion within the trial court to decide 
whether a guilty plea may be withdrawn, even though 
the guilty plea may have been induced by a breached 
plea bargaining agreement. 
In the instant case, the trial court determined 
that a Motion to Vacate a guilty plea brought eight 
months after the breach of the plea bargaining agreement, 
including a full five months after the imposition of 
sentence, was too late for defendant to withdraw the 
guilty plea. The trial court stressed that the passage 
of eight months was not the critical factor but rather 
that defendant had said nothing about the breach during 
_*3_ 
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that time even though he had numerous opportunities to com-
plain of the breach. By remaining silent about the 
breach of the agreement defendant waived his right 
to complain after eight months had gone by, the 
trial court held. 
Defendant has not established that the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying the Motion to 
Vacate the guilty plea. Although defendant relies on 
the United States Supreme Court case of Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 92 S.Ct. 495 
(1971) to argue that the trial court judge abused his 
discretion as a matter of law, the Santobello case 
involved a different factual situation than that at 
issue herein. 
In Santobello, the prosecutor agreed to offer 
no recommendation for sentencing in exchange for 
defendants guilty plea to a lesser charge. However, 
at the time of sentencing a new prosecutor who was not 
made aware of the agreement recommended the maximum 
sentence. The defendant's attorney immediately objected 
and sought to withdraw the guilty plea. The trial 
court judge refused to permit the withdrawal of the 
guilty plea, stating that he was not influenced by the 
prosecutor's recommendation. 
-4-
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The United States Supreme Court found that 
Santobello's guilty plea had been induced by the 
prosecutor's promise to offer no recommendation as to 
sentencing. The Court thus remanded the case for a 
determination by the trial court relative to whether 
the circumstances of the case required the withdrawal 
of the guilty plea and a new trial, or specific per-
formance of the agreement on the plea and resentencing 
by another judge. 
In the instant case defendant did not immediately 
object to the breach of the plea bargaining agreement. 
In fact, he waited until December 5, 197 5, to move the 
court to withdraw the guilty plea he had entered on 
March 4, 1975. Defendant did not mention at the time of 
sentencing on the guilty plea that he had in fact appeared 
in Brigham City and entered a guilty plea to a gun 
charge and that he was given a concurrent sentence on the 
second charge. 
The trial court judge has correctly distinguished 
the above factual situation from the Santobello case and 
thus Santobello cannot be said to require as a matter of 
law the withdrawal of the guilty plea in the instant 
case. The trial court judge in the instant case carefully 
weighed Santobello, as his memorandum decision (R-57) 
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indicates, found it premised upon a different factual 
situation than that at issue herein, and determined 
that defendant's failure to complain of the unkept plea 
bargain for eight months, including the time of 
sentencing, waived defendant's right to withdraw the 
guilty plea. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court to 
either allow or disallow a guilty plea to be withdrawn• 
State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d 825 (1932). The 
Supreme Court will look to the particular facts of each 
case to determine if the trial court judge abused 
his discretion in refusing to permit the withdrawal of 
a guilty plea. State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 124, 378 
P.2d 671 (1963). 
Given the fact that defendant herein passed 
up numerous opportunities to complain of the unkept 
plea bargain, that he permitted eight months to pass 
before complaining about the breached agreement, that 
he said nothing at the time of sentencing, that the 
concurrent sentence had long since been served, the 
trial court judge in his discretion properly determined 
that defendant waited far too long to seek to withdraw 
his guilty plea. Defendant has failed to prove that 
the trial court judge abused his discretion in refusing 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea given the 
above factual situation. 
Other cases cited by appellant require no 
more than that there be a full factual inquiry into 
a defendant's allegation that a guilty plea was in-
duced by an unkept promise. Walters v. Harris, 460 
F.2d 988 (1972); Machibroda v. U.S., 368 U.S. 487, 
82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962). In the instant 
case, appellant was given a full hearing, the above 
facts were weighed, and the trial court denied the 
Motion to Vacate. 
POINT II 
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT APPELLANT SHOULD BE 
GRANTED A REMEDY, APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO NO MORE 
THAN THE BENEFIT OF HIS BARGAIN. 
If the court should find that the factual 
situation herein requires a remedy for appellant, 
respondent would argue that appellant is entitled to 
the benefit of his bargain, and no more. Appellant 
relies on Santobello v. New York, supra, to establish 
that his guilty plea should be withdrawn. However, 
if the court should find Santobello applicable to 
the instant case, respondent would note that the 
Santobello court remanded that case for a determination 
as to whether the defendant should be permitted to 
-7~ 
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withdraw his guilty plea and go to trial or whether 
he should be given the benefit of his bargain. 
To permit appellant herein to withdraw 
his guilty plea at this late date would greatly 
prejudice the state. Appellant would then be given 
a trial many months after the incident which is the 
subject of the guilty plea. This delay certainly 
would create difficulty in gathering witnesses and 
facts necessary for trial. Appellant would greatly 
benefit by his own lack of diligence in bringing to 
the attention of the court the breach of the plea 
bargaining agreement. 
Respondent would thus argue that appellant 
is entitled to no more than the benefit of his 
bargain; should the court find that appellant is 
entitled to a remedy. Although appellant has long 
since served a concurrent sentence on the guilty 
plea entered in Box Elder County, the record could be 
corrected to comply with the plea bargaining agreement. 
To permit appellant to withdraw his guilty plea and go 
to trial punishes the state for appellant's failure 
to complain of the breach of the plea bargaining agree-
ment. To give appellant the benefit of his bargain 
~8-
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would place the parties in the position anticipated 
at the time the plea bargain was agreed upon. 
CONCLUSION 
Where appellant let eight months pass before 
he complained about the breach of a plea bargaining 
agreement, including five months after the imposition 
of sentence, and let numerous opportunities go by 
without complaining about the unkept agreement, 
appellant has waived his right to have the guilty 
plea vacated. If the court should find that appellant 
is entitled to a remedy, he should be given no more 
than the benefit of the bargain. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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